For traditional tools to work, oppressed countries first need help in resolving problems in their economic and social development the their people will have the time and energy to think about political regime, education, and freedom of speech, i. China has adhered to such a strategy since the early s. This has been particularly obvious in its relations with Myanmar. Without attempting to appear more democratic than it was, China did not reject cooperation with Myanmar when the military rule there seemed if not stable then at least understandably evolving into a hybrid regime.
China expands the traditional soft power concept through the notion of the universal need for human development, primarily for development buttressed by economic growth. China believes various types of economic cooperation, from building HPPs and TPPs to promoting national IT products, to be parts of soft power and views national interests, the interests of business, and sustainable development as something that has long since formed an integral whole. China transitioned from the strategy of being a neutral mediator to the multilateral diplomacy of an indirect participant in the conflict.
For instance, in , when the Yunnan province was inundated with refugees from Myanmar, China appointed a special envoy as a leading contact person and official observer at peace talks. At the time, the U. Additionally, unlike China, the U. This is why the American Center working at the U. Embassy, which offered Fulbright and Hubert H. As a result, even corporations that earmarked large funds for education, healthcare, and water supply infrastructure limited their efforts in order not to be punished by the U. Department of the Treasury and thereby yielded their places to China.
Dissolution is not the worst thing that could happen to U. In the fall of , Myanmar will hold general elections. However, even now, old discords are being revived and new confrontations are emerging. This is primarily taking place between Westernized followers of the National League for Democracy and the supporters of the nationalist Union of Solidarity and Development Party.
The former are attempting to limit the power of the military by amending the Constitution and to expand the rights of children of foreign citizens to obtain citizenship. One advantage of reparation policies, as opposed to restorative justice, is that they are said to be morally neutral: the reliance on the economic dimension is a way to free the relations from an overwhelming affective and moral weight. To that extent, reparations do achieve one of the main goals of TJ: inclusiveness, in the sense that all citizens become part of a common political project De Greiff, b.
Generally, the benefits of reparations are coordinated in a holistic manner, as part of a wider TJ program that would also include prosecutions, truth telling, and institutional reforms De Greiff, b. Reparations embody the cost of wrongdoing. Therefore, they should always include a symbolic element, where the giving of compensation itself acknowledges the responsibility and sends a message about the seriousness of the wrong or the sincerity of the responsible party to make things right Walker, a: Other types of compensation could include, apart from monetary payments to individuals, the restitution of lost property, the building of memorials, the naming of streets after victims, or the revision of history books.
The truth itself is sometimes considered a form of reparation: when families learn where the bodies of their loved ones are buried, for instance, the injury may begin to repair. Official apologies too are sometimes included in the reparative paradigm: unlike material or political reparations, their aim is to promote reconciliation through words only, by public acts of contrition and repentance De Greiff, However, the idea that a simple expression of regret can right the wrongs caused during a civil war or a genocide appears to be shocking at first glance: words seem trivial when it comes to recovering from mass violence.
Monetary compensation is therefore often considered a necessary complement to all those symbolic measures such as apologies or rehabilitation. Reconciliation after mass atrocities requires a credibility that only the implementation of a tangible economic and social program can provide Terreblanche, ; Hayner, The line is indeed thin between payment as acknowledgement and payment as alibi. Another problem concerns the timing of reparations: where does one stop compensating or being accountable for past abuses? Reparations raise the question of our obligations towards our predecessors.
Despite the ethical problems of such evaluation, we may wonder how responsibility can be assigned over such a long time frame. Is there only one single cause for present injustices? However, he did insist that members of a State share a collective responsibility for crimes committed by their government Fletcher and Weinstein, To the extent that a German citizen benefits from his membership in a community, he must also take responsibility for the wrongs committed by his predecessors:. Jaspers affirmed that this responsibility entailed the need to make reparations Wiedergutmachung.
The notion of gaining compensation for those who suffered injustice in the past does seem uncontroversial at first glance. Antoine Garapon considers that demands for reparations are an extension of this wider movement of juridification of history at the expense of the political. Indeed, the main instrument of reparation claims is not criminal but civil law. Reparation policies are essentially backward looking. Their claims are rooted in commemorative projects, calling attention to the past mistreatment of individuals in an attempt to recognize and repair this victimization.
To that extent, reparations are not connected to current economic disadvantage: this focus on the past is sometimes considered as a serious limitation to their healing power. South Africa is a telling example of the limits of restoration and timely reparation programs without longer termed adjustment policies to address the economic and social dimension of apartheid.
TRCs have therefore been criticized for the paucity of their concrete effects Chapman and Van der Merwe, Black people are still economically marginalized. The South African TRC has been blamed for that failure, for having focused too much on gross human rights abuses rather than on the suffering experienced daily by Blacks, and the benefits enjoyed by Whites as a result of those systemic structural injustices Mamdani, 3. The Whites, as beneficiaries, were never made accountable. Rosenberg, Should only the main perpetrators be named? Or also those who made the violations possible, those who created the structural climate and ideology, or who simply benefited from that climate?
In that case, the argument behind distributive policies is that TJ should not only deal with physical abuses, detention, torture, or murder, but also with other forms of injustices: forced removals, pass laws, broken families, and land occupation Mamdani, Victims should then be redefined as to include those whose lives were mutilated in the day-to-day web of regulations in which the atrocities took place. If structural violence is to be addressed too, then social justice might be a way of dealing with the past as well. The relation between perpetrators and victims, which is the central focus of TJ, should therefore be extended to beneficiaries.
This structural aspect, however, has long been ignored in the TJ field. Such demands are rooted in the assumption that the past system in which the violations took place was one of structural violence and domination colonialism, apartheid, slavery, segregation and that this legacy is the cause of continuing economic disadvantages.
Structural social reforms are the most forward looking measure of TJ, as they look for a way of transforming the current conditions of the victims themselves and their descendants. Through them, TJ becomes connected to a broader project of social justice, one that could take the form of redistributive policies, development, or affirmative action programs Roht-Arriaza and Orlovsky, This connection between TJ and development is only recent, and still calls for more research De Greiff and Duthie, It is a consequence of the evolution of the concept of development itself, from a purely economic to a more human perspective, based on capabilities Sen, ; Crocker, ; UNDP, Development, in this understanding, implies political participation and active citizenship.
TJ, by healing and empowering victims, could help make this social integration possible De Greiff, Because poverty and victimhood share the same effects, development and TJ should go hand in hand. South Africa after the TRC is a case in point, with racism and de facto apartheid continuing until today. Post-traumatic stress is another factor.
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Violence against women actually tends to increase in the post-conflict period Nagy, ; Valji, Including such social measures into TJ would imply a major shift in its philosophy. Indeed, as we have seen, TJ since its inception has largely been under the influence of a liberal paradigm, which insists on legalism and political rights rather than on economic or cultural ones. To that aim, TJ usually focuses more on direct forms of political violence than on economic, social, or structural violence.
As we have seen, this failure to take into account the deeper structural patterns of exclusion and domination is problematic if one considers TJ a performative tool, or a speech act Nagy, ; Miller, Not taking into account the socio-economic roots of conflict means supporting structural violence, and planting the seeds of future conflicts. If socio-economic issues are left out of the picture, the story that will be told of the conflict will be a purely political one. If TJ is divorced from land redistribution and economic change for instance, it may give legitimacy to the myth that the conflict was purely political, or ethnic, but not based on deeper distributive economic inequalities Miller, ; Mani, It suggests that present inequalities are only a question of time and development, rather than the result of a deliberate elite ideology.
As we have seen, the story told at the TRC in South Africa was often criticized for being a story of racism and individual violations, rather than one of long-term, systemic abuses Mamdani, The same can be said about Rwanda, where the narrative of years of unequal land distribution under colonial rule, and the deep resentment against the Tutsis that resulted, has often been neglected in the name of a purely ethnic reading of the conflict Miller, Restoration of the moral order and economic justice should therefore go hand-in-hand.
This implies recognizing that the goal of reconciliation cannot be obtained immediately, through truth telling, trials and forgiveness. If the roots of violence are structural, the legacy will run deep and it will take generations for some kind of equilibrium to be reached. This broader shift of reparations towards distributive and development programs may therefore be perceived as a threat to liberal ideas, or at least invite a reformulation of their principles, since liberalism does not generally support the notion of group rights, cultural rights, and affirmative action Renaut, Here again, law, politics, and morality tend to become confused.
Is the economic system that is created after mass violence necessarily normative? Can a strictly neutral distribution of goods, as the liberal distribution pattern pretends to afford, be enough? Or do victims in the aftermath of mass atrocity call for special rights, for group rights? This transformation of TJ could mean integrating group rights and collective recognition procedures as a new rationale for social redistribution — something liberals have long been reluctant to do, always carefully separating the field of justice from that of culture and group recognition Fraser, ; Honneth, ; Fraser and Honneth, Taking equality seriously might thus mean rethinking distributive justice as such Renaut, As we have seen, TJ has a clear teleological nature that might contradict the traditional, procedural, understanding of liberalism predominant since Rawls.
TJ therefore gives politics an existential, quasi-romantic aspect that liberals have tended to be, sometimes with good reasons, reluctant to admit. Rorty, These are questions open for future research in the field of TJ.
The several weaknesses that we have highlighted in the retributive, restorative, and social dimensions of TJ could lead one to abandon the pursuit of reconciliation and remembrance altogether, acknowledging the fact that all responses are inadequate after mass violence, and that we cannot ever expect a sense of closure or completion. Indeed, it is important not to have unrealistic expectations about what TJ can and cannot do.
Is that an argument in favor of amnesia as a tool of political transition? Some countries might defend immediate executions and lustration, or vetting, for a society to simply move on Mayer-Rieckh and De Greiff, ; Michnik and Havel, We know that this option was advocated amongst the Allies after World War II before the Nuremberg solution was chosen. The argument in favor of forgetting and moving on might be tempting, but even if one accepts it, the question remains: forget what?
TJ is therefore important at least for defining what it is that must be forgotten in order for the country to move on and look forward. Knowing the past, then, is an imperative Elster, A major danger in the aftermath of mass atrocity is indeed silence. Democracies can only be built on unfettered communication and a public space dominated by the use of public reason. There is therefore a real need to recreate the communication that has been lost through mass violence — if only for the victims. There is nothing more to say about it. The way one feels is as incomparable as it is indescribable.
Pain marks the limits of the power of communication. TJ, for all its flaws, provides the basis for communication about the past and contributes to ensuring that it will not be instrumentalized by future leaders. The refbusal to acknowledge the past, by whatever means, only widens the gap between victims and perpetrators, making an unbiased communication between the two sides even harder.
The Chechen Wars, where memories of past suffering have been a major source of ethnic mobilization, are a case in point Williams, Even if it is true that TJ might lead to the past being seen as an obsession, a policy of enforced amnesia is not a viable alternative for new democracies emerging from a period of intense human rights violations. Unacknowledged injustice might only poison societies and create new cycles of violence Walker, a. If forgetting is not a viable option, what form should TJ take to ensure that the past is dealt with in the most appropriate manner?
As we have seen, although TJ has recently become a well-established fixture in the global field of human rights — and even a body of customary law and a normative standard — it can be criticized on several grounds. The fact that it is more often the international community which provides fragile, newly created governments with the means to reckon with their past, can be a matter of concern. Too often, the international community adopts a technocratic, one-size-fits-all approach that can be damaging. TJ has become steeped in western liberalism, often appearing as distant and remote to those who actually need it most Nagy, But ultimately, the resolution of conflict lies in the society in which it occurs: external agents can only build capacities that increase the likelihood of peace.
Rebuilding social capital and livelihood systems is harder than restoring infrastructures and institutions. It involves redefining relationships, promoting public deliberation, creating a healthy civil society, facilitating the healing process, as well as making institutions both trustworthy and effectively trusted De Greiff, b. It is interesting, however, to observe that TJ itself is not questioned anymore: there is now a general consensus in favor of justice, accountability and dealing with the past Scheffer, As we have seen, TJ is a performative tool, an inherently selective process which involves the delimitation of a narrative and the exclusion of others.
Broadly understood, the framework should include structural and gender-based violence which, as we have seen in the matter of reparations, is often left out of the picture. TJ is still under the influence of the liberal-legalist paradigm which tends to favor freedom and liberty over equality, undermining the socio-economic and gendered roots of the conflicts Mani, Broadening the scope of TJ and transition might also be understood geographically, so as to include democratic countries in the northern hemisphere too.
Even democratic societies have their share of unacknowledged past injustices, whose effects are corrosive and deep. The legacy of colonization in France, especially regarding Algeria, is also a case in point. Is it reconciliation, understood as friendship, love and forgiveness? That is enough! While it is true that efforts to impose a single national narrative and to build a substantive solidarity from the top might compromise democratic plurality, a too thin account may remain too abstract after mass violence.
Can post-conflict societies be satisfied with such a modest goal of reconciliation? Can trust between former enemies really be developed on the basis of strictly procedural rules? Is nothing deeper required? If we understand reconciliation as thick solidarity, then TJ should be given a substantial rule-setting function.
Such a function is essential in the aftermath of mass atrocities, as those are times when all limits disappear. Not doing so violates the moral trust that there are recognized, shared rules by which we live and which we can count on to protect and guide us. Such trust is essential for any community. To overcome this tension between thick and thin reconciliation, perhaps we could think of TJ in a post-traditional moral way: without agreeing on any substantial particular norm, morality can indeed derive a meaning from an inter-subjective process of socialization.
The missing transcendent, substantive morality in conflicting societies could then be replaced by an immanent process of deliberation, in a Habermassian fashion. The aim of TJ would therefore be the building of this discursive solidarity in the aftermath of mass atrocity Habermas, It is the resetting of this lost communication that should be the aim.
Indeed, if victim and perpetrator do not share a minimum of common language or norm, they will be unable to ask or grant forgiveness. TJ is then to be understood as an intersubjective mode of deliberation. This only applies to British nationals already resident in Denmark on the exit day. The Danish government will continue its work on a permanent solution for British citizens after Brexit. You can read more about legal residence following a no deal-Brexit on the website of the Ministry of Immigration and Integration.
If you are a British citizen or a family member of a British citizen residing in Denmark without being in possession of an EU registration certificate certificate in the format of a letter issued to EU citizens or an EU residence card residence card issued to third country nationals in the format of a credit card , or without having applied yet, you are encouraged to submit an application for such documentation before the withdrawal date.
This will make it easier for you to prove that you have a right of residence, and for Danish authorities to determine that you are residing legally in Denmark on the withdrawal date. Applications for registration certificates and residence cards are submitted to the Agency for International Recruitment and Integration. You may apply for EU registration certificates and EU residence cards after the withdrawal date.
It should be stressed that your right of residence is not lost if you have not been issued with one of the documents mentioned above. Your right of residence is not dependent on the documents. In a no deal-scenario, the Danish Brexit Act will extend the rights under EU law for British citizens and their family members, who are legally residing in Denmark on the withdrawal date. However, regarding social pension, it is only a condition that the citizen in question has earned the right to social pension before the withdrawal date.
This means that when a Danish law requires that a person has lived in Denmark for a certain period for them to be entitled to a benefit, British citizens and their family members can include periods of residence in the UK and other EU countries. This principle applies to EU citizens according to EU law and will be carried forward for British citizens as well during the transitional period. In addition to periods of residence, some laws require membership of an unemployment insurance fund for a certain period insurance period or completed periods of employment before a citizen can obtain the right to certain benefits.
The same principle of right to aggregate periods from the UK and other EU countries will apply to those periods. This only applies to periods in the UK and EU countries before the withdrawal date. However, family members who permanently reside in the UK as of the exit date and arrive in Denmark later may include periods until the date of arrival. You can read more about the right to cash benefits on the website of the Danish Agency for Labour Market and Recruitment.http://olgabiryukova.com/scripts/jyra-wo-zu-kaufen.php
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Right to social service benefits and daycare. All persons who are legally resident in Denmark are entitled to services under the Day-Care Facilities Act. In case of a no deal-Brexit, British citizens will as a rule be considered third country nationals.
However, the Act on Social Services does not distinguish between EU-citizen and third country nationals. All British citizens, who are legally residing in Denmark, will have the same rights to social service benefits as before Brexit. The same applies to the Day-Care Facilities Act, under which all parents who legally reside in Denmark are entitled to services.
The sole exemption is subsidies for minding your own children. Only parents who have resided in Denmark for at least seven of the past eight years and have sufficient Danish language skills are entitled to this subsidy. EU-citizens are exempt from these requirements. Under the Danish transitional scheme, all British citizens who are legally residing in Denmark at the time of withdrawal will continue to be exempt as if they were still EU citizens. However, this exemption does not cover British citizens who move to Denmark after Brexit. All residents in Denmark have access to the public healthcare system.
If you are a British citizen residing in Denmark, you will have access to the public healthcare system in Denmark. This will also be the case after a no deal-Brexit. If you are a British worker employed in Denmark, but you do not reside here, you and your co-insured family members have a right to public healthcare benefits in Denmark. If you are a frontier worker, who do not reside in Denmark, but you are employed here and you return to another EU Member State at least once a week, you have a right to public healthcare benefits in Denmark.
Co-insured family members of a frontier worker will have limited access to public health care benefits.
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If you are a British citizen temporarily staying in Denmark after Brexit or if you are a frontier worker after Brexit, you will be considered a third country national and will therefore only have the right to acute treatment during your stay in Denmark. You can read more about your rights to healthcare benefits at the Danish Patient Safety Authority here. S tudent rights. In a no deal-scenario, the Danish Brexit Act will extend your existing EU rights as a student in Denmark for a transitional period.
The act will apply to British citizens and their family members, who are legally residing in Denmark at the time of withdrawal. The act will be put in effect if the UK leaves the EU without an agreement and will apply until replaced by a permanent solution. The Danish Brexit Act will secure your student rights according to EU law during a transitional period, meaning you will have the same access to the Danish higher educational system as EU citizens. You can read more about student rights according to EU law on the website of the Ministry of Higher Education and Science and on www.
Access to primary and secondary education including vocational educational training. In a no deal-scenario, the Danish Brexit Act will maintain most existing EU-rights regarding access to education for British citizens and their family members resident in Denmark at the time of withdrawal for a transitional period. In terms of vocational education and training, the act extends your rights with regard to state subsidies including wage subsidies as well as financial support for vocational students.
In terms of primary and secondary schools, the act extends your rights with regard to state subsidies free elementary schools, secondary schools and free vocational schools as well as the right to mother-tongue teaching primary and lower secondary schools. You can read more on the website of the Ministry of Education [only in Danish].